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Abstract
Hedge funds databases are typically subject to high attrition rates
because of fund termination and self-selection. Even when all funds are
included up to their last available return, one cannot prevent that ex
post conditioning biases aﬀect standard estimates of performance per-
sistence. In this paper we analyze the persistence in the performance
of U.S. hedge funds taking into account look-ahead bias (multi-period
sampling bias). To do so, we model attrition of hedge funds and an-
alyze how it depends upon historical performance. Next, we use a
weighting procedure that eliminates look-ahead bias in measures for
performance persistence. The results show that the impact of look-
a h e a db i a si sq u i t es e v e r e ,e v e nt h o u g hp o s i t i v ea n dn e g a t i v es u r v i v a l -
related biases are sometimes suggested to cancel out. At horizons of
one and four quarters, we ﬁnd clear evidence of positive persistence in
hedge fund returns, also after correcting for investment style. At the
two-year horizon, past winning funds tend to perform poorly in the
future.
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11 Introduction
During the last decade, hedge funds have gained tremendous popularity, par-
ticularly in the USA. Hedge funds are similar to mutual funds in that they
provide actively managed portfolios in publicly traded assets. Unlike mu-
tual funds however, they have a broad ﬂexibility in the type of securities
they hold and the type of positions they take. They can invest in inter-
national and domestic equities and debt, and the entire array of derivative
securities. They may take undiversiﬁed positions, sell short and lever up
the portfolio (see, e.g., Fung and Hsieh, 1997, Liang, 2000). According to
Brown and Goetzmann (2001), hedge funds are best deﬁned by their freedom
from regulatory controls stipulated by the Investment Company Act of 1940.
Especially these non-standard features make hedge funds an interesting in-
vestment alternative with potential diversiﬁcation beneﬁts for the existing
portfolio.
The question whether hedge funds show persistence in their performance
receives much attention in the recent literature (see, e.g. Agarwal and Naik,
2000). The underlying idea behind these studies is that investors usually
invest more in funds that recently performed well in the expectation that
these funds will continue to do so in the future. However, many empiri-
cal studies concerning mutual funds show that active selection, on average,
underperforms passive investment strategies. Testing whether an active se-
lection strategy makes sense is even more relevant in the hedge fund industry
because hedge fund investors are often confronted with lockup periods, that
may be as long as one year, during which the invested money cannot be
withdrawn. Moreover, many funds apply a redemption notice period of up
to 90 days.
A major problem in evaluating hedge fund performance and its persis-
tence is the relatively high attrition rate. For example, Brown, Goetzmann
and Ibbotson (1999) report an attrition rate of about 14% per year over
1987-1996. If fund survival (directly or indirectly) depends upon historical
performance, it is well known that standard methods of analysis may lead
to biased results (see, e.g. Brown et al., 1992, Carpenter and Lynch, 1999,
or Ter Horst, Nijman and Verbeek, 2001). Spurious persistence patterns
may arise, the form of which depends upon the survival process and the un-
derlying heterogeneity in fund characteristics. While most studies attempt
to eliminate survivorship bias by taking fund returns into account until the
moment of disappearance, a second ex-post conditioning bias, the so-called
look-ahead bias, is usually not accounted for. This bias arises because the
employed methodology implicitly or explicitly conditions upon survival over
a number of consecutive periods. When analyzing performance persistence,
2for example, the fact that funds dissolve in a nonrandom way during the
ranking or evaluation period may cause a bias (see, e.g. Carhart, 1997). As
stressed by ter Horst, Verbeek and Nijman (2001), the elimination of look-
ahead bias requires that the methodology be adjusted. An essential step in
the correction procedure is to model the survival process of hedge funds and
how it relates to their (historical) performance.
As noted by Fung and Hsieh (1997, 2000) and Liang (2000), practical
problems may complicate this issue. Because the hedge fund industry is
highly unregulated, and data sets may be subject to backﬁlling biases, a
careful analysis is required. A wide range of empirical problems need to
be taken into account in order to prevent biased results (see, e.g. Fung
and Hsieh, 1997, Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft, 1999, Agarwal and
Naik 2000). One of these potential biases is a self-selection bias that arises
due to the fact that hedge funds voluntarily report to a data vendor. Since
hedge funds are not allowed to advertise publicly, these data vendors serve
as an important distribution channel. Thus, self-selection bias exists either
because underperfomers do not wish to make their performance known, be-
cause funds that performed well have less incentive to report to data vendors
to attract potential investors, or because funds do not wish intervention in
case SEC interprets reporting as illegal advertising. Ackermann, McEnally
and Ravenscraft (1999) suggest that the previously mentioned survivorship
bias and the self-selection bias cancel out. While it may be the case that,
e.g., average fund returns are more or less unaﬀected by the joint operation of
endogenous self-selection and liquidation, it is not possible, in general, that
these two processes leave the cross-sectional and time-series distributions of
returns unaﬀected Whether or not self-selection bias arises and whether or
not it cancels out look-ahead bias will therefore necessarily depend upon the
focus of study and the methodology used.
In this paper we empirically analyze the persistence in the performance
of hedge funds that report returns in US$ over the period 1994-2000. To
correct for ex post conditioning biases, we apply the methodology proposed
in ter Horst, Nijman and Verbeek (2001). This approach requires a well-
speciﬁed model that explains survival of hedge funds and how it depends upon
historical performance. We extend the model of Liang (2000) by allowing
for a ﬂexible impact of historical returns, by incorporating aggregate time
eﬀects to capture economy-wide shocks that aﬀect survival rates of all hedge
funds, and by carefully testing for potential sources of misspeciﬁcation. Next,
we analyze the persistence in hedge fund performance during this period,
correcting for look-ahead bias.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
describe the sample of hedge funds that we employ and describe the potential
3biases that could arise. In Section 3 we model the survival process of hedge
funds. Section 4 examines persistence in performance for a sample of hedge
funds over the period 1994 - 2000, taking into account the potential biases
that might be present. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Hedge funds data
Hedge funds seek to deliver high absolute returns and typically have fea-
tures such as hurdle rates and incentive fees with high watermark provision.
Investors in hedge funds are often confronted with lockup periods and re-
demption notice periods. Such restrictions on withdrawals imply smaller
cash ﬂuctuations, and give fund managers more freedom in setting up long-
term or illiquid positions. However, investors that follow an active selection
strategy of investing in funds that recently performed well might be nega-
tively aﬀected by this lockup period.
Agarwal and Naik (2000) distinguish ‘non-directional’ and ‘directional’
hedge funds. Non-directional funds are characterized by having a low corre-
lation with the market (market-neutral), while directional funds are highly
correlated with the market. These categories are divided in ten popular
strategies (ﬁxed-income arbitrage, event driven, equity hedge, restructuring,
event arbitrage, capital structure arbitrage, macro, long, hedge, short), which
prove to be dramatically diﬀerent from those of mutual funds as they are not
based on static asset allocation but on dynamic exposures to passive indices.
As mentioned above, U.S. based (onshore) hedge funds are free from reg-
ulatory controls stipulated by the Investment Company Act of 1940. Since
1996 the number of U.S. investors allowed in unregulated funds is 500. More-
over, domestic hedge funds can accept money from “qualiﬁed investors”, who
have at least $5 million to invest and have “sophisticated understanding” of
ﬁnancial markets. In addition they can accept money from pension funds
that have at least $25 million in capital. A distinction is made between on-
shore and oﬀshore funds, where the latter type of funds is typically developed
to raise capital from non-US investors. Oﬀshore hedge funds are non-U.S.
corporations, typically registered in a tax-haven and as such they are not
regulated by the SEC. The number of net worth investors is not limited and
participation from U.S. investors is still restricted. As mentioned by Liang
(2000) it is common practice that onshore funds report only returns, while
oﬀshore funds might report both assets and returns.
These distinctive features, particularly the low level of regulation and
the long lockup periods, give hedge funds large ﬂexibility in the types of
positions they can take, by using short selling, leverage and derivatives. It
4allows them to have a dynamic position by holding diverse asset categories
and moving quickly across them. Besides unregulation, strong managerial
incentives constitute a second important feature characterizing this industry.
Such incentives are largely based on performance. On average, fund managers
receive around 20% of annual proﬁts, as well as an annual management fee
of about 1%. There is no incentive fee until the fund has recovered past
losses (i.e. returns have to surpass a threshold or “high water-mark”). This
incentive structure could lead to excessive risk taking, although this is often
dampened by a substantial managerial investment in the fund and the fact
that managers may incur in liabilities as general partners.
In this paper we use hedge fund data from TASS Management Limited.
In principle, the TASS database goes back to 1979, although the initial years
typically contain very few funds. By the beginning of the 1990s, about 200
funds were in the database. The fact that by 1998 more than 1400 (living)
funds are available illustrates the increased importance of the hedge fund in-
dustry. Information on defunct funds is available only for funds that attrited
in 1994 or later. For the empirical results we shall therefore concentrate on
the period 1994-2000.
Below we shall focus on hedge funds reporting returns in US$. This results
in a total of 1797 funds, of which 1185 are active in the ﬁrst quarter of 2000.
This corresponds with an average annual attrition rate of 8.6% from 1994
to 20001, very close to the rate of 8.3% that was reported for 1994-1998 by
Liang (2000) (using a similar data set). Table 1 provides detailed information
on the numbers of funds that enter and leave our data set in each quarter.
For example, in the ﬁrst quarter of 1997, 69 funds enter the sample, while 30
attrite. Given that 1069 funds were present at the beginning of the quarter,
this corresponds to an attrition rate of 2.81%. Recall that attrition is caused
by both self-selection and fund termination.
In Table 2 we provide average quarterly returns for diﬀerent subsets of
funds, as well as the returns on the S&P 500 index. The column labelled
‘all’ refers to all funds that were present in a given quarter, the column
‘alive’ refers to funds that are still active in the ﬁrst quarter in 2000, while
‘dead’ refers to funds that had left the database by the end of our sample
period. Clearly, the table indicates that average returns of dead funds are
substantially below those of active funds. For example, the average return
in the ﬁrst quarter of 1995 of funds that are still active in 2000 is 4.0%,
while the average return is only 2.5% for funds that have attrited by 2000.
Combining both subsets produces an average quarterly return in the ﬁrst
1The average annual attrition rate is computed as four times the (unweighted) average
quarterly attrition rate.
5Quarter Funds entering existing leaving attrition rate
1994-I 50 577 0 0.00
1994-II 38 627 0 0.00
1994-III 60 665 2 0.30
1994-IV 55 723 5 0.69
1995-I 64 773 3 0.39
1995-II 47 834 14 1.68
1995-III 52 867 14 1.61
1995-IV 53 905 10 1.10
1996-I 67 948 18 1.90
1996-II 51 997 23 2.31
1996-III 63 1025 34 3.32
1996-IV 44 1054 29 2.75
1997-I 69 1069 30 2.81
1997-II 56 1108 26 2.35
1997-III 65 1138 28 2.46
1997-IV 46 1175 17 1.45
1998-I 68 1204 27 2.24
1998-II 41 1245 31 2.49
1998-III 57 1255 58 4.62
1998-IV 32 1254 38 3.03
1999-I 49 1248 27 2.16
1999-II 26 1270 40 3.15
1999-III 34 1256 45 3.58
1999-IV 13 1245 52 4.18
2000-I 20 1206 41 3.40
overall 612 2.16
Table 1: Numbers of US hedge funds entering and leaving TASS database
1994-2000
6Quarter all funds alive funds dead funds S&P 500
1994-I -0.018 -0.015 -0.022 -0.035
1994-II 0.011 0.009 0.014 0.008
1994-III 0.017 0.026 0.004 0.042
1994-IV -0.011 -0.010 -0.013 0.002
1995-I 0.034 0.040 0.025 0.100
1995-II 0.041 0.054 0.021 0.097
1995-III 0.039 0.049 0.025 0.069
1995-IV 0.041 0.042 0.041 0.065
1996-I 0.031 0.036 0.023 0.067
1996-II 0.060 0.063 0.054 0.040
1996-III 0.019 0.024 0.011 0.025
1996-IV 0.057 0.066 0.039 0.081
1997-I 0.045 0.046 0.044 0.030
1997-II 0.051 0.054 0.044 0.178
1997-III 0.075 0.080 0.063 0.077
1997-IV -0.010 -0.004 -0.024 0.020
1998-I 0.048 0.058 0.019 0.146
1998-II -0.012 -0.006 -0.033 0.040
1998-III -0.049 -0.049 -0.049 -0.138
1998-IV 0.051 0.061 0.006 0.251
1999-I 0.031 0.039 -0.010 0.056
1999-II 0.078 0.086 0.023 0.071
1999-III 0.005 0.007 -0.012 -0.068
1999-IV 0.129 0.136 0.024 0.138
2000-I 0.060 0.063 -0.018 0.038
overall 0.033 0.038 0.012 0.056
Table 2: Average returns of US hedge funds 1994-2000
7quarter of 1995 of 3.4%. Over the entire sample period, average returns of
surviving funds are about 2.1% (per annum) above the average returns of
all funds, a number which Malkiel (1995), Liang (2000) and others refer to
as the “survivorship bias”. This estimate is between the 1.5% of Fung and
Hsieh (2000) and the numbers presented by Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson
(1999) [3%] and Liang (2000) [2.24%].
While it is commonly accepted that funds with a relatively bad perfor-
mance are more likely to be dissolved, it is not clear a priori over which period
historical returns are important to explain survival. To obtain some insight
into this question, Figure 1 presents conditional attrition rates (hazard rates)
by performance decile over the next eight quarters. That is, in each quarter
funds are ranked on the basis of (gross, raw) returns and divided into 10
deciles. Next, for each decile, the average attrition rate is determined for one
up to eight quarters after the ranking period. It is clear from the ﬁgure that
in the ﬁrst four quarters conditional attrition rates for loser funds (decile 1)
are much higher than for winner funds (decile 10), while for the last two or
three quarters the relationship is almost ﬂat. This seems to indicate that
quarterly returns are important determinants of subsequent attrition rates
over the next four or so quarters, while after 8 quarters attrition rates are
basically the same, independent of initial returns.
There are a number of classiﬁcation methods for hedge funds’ investment
styles commonly used by data vendors, although none appears to be univer-
sally accepted. The TASS database employs two diﬀerent classiﬁcations. The
classiﬁcation we use initially contains 17 styles which are mutually exclusive
and closely correspond to the commonly used Tremont hedge fund style in-
dices. It takes into account diﬀerent dimensions simultaneously: asset class,
geographical focus and investment bias (i.e. U.S. equity hedge funds; Euro-
pean equity hedge funds; Asian equity hedge funds; pure leveraged currency;
ﬁxed income directional; convertible fund (long only); etc.). However, this
investment style is not available for 269 funds (of which 242 are dead funds).
This represents a major drawback since we intend to study survival-related
biases by investment style. In order to determine the style of this subsample
of funds, we apply multiple discriminant analysis.
For all funds in the TASS database, we observe indications of their in-
vestment style through a set of 15 overlapping style indicators (e.g. bottom
up, market neutral, fundamental, ...). On average, each fund is character-
ized by at least four of these styles. The subsample of funds for which we
also observe a unique style classiﬁcation according to the 17 styles distin-
guished above, is used to determine a set of discriminant functions. These
















Post-formation rate of dead funds
Ranking criterion : past one-quarter excess returns
In each quarter from 01/1994 to 01/2000, funds are ranked into decile portfolios
based on their previous one-quarter net excess returns. For the quarter subsequent
to initial ranking and for each of the next 8 quarters after formation, the rate of dead
funds as a percentage of the total number of funds still existing at the beginning of
each period is determined. Thus, the bar in cell (i,j) represents the conditional
probability of dying in the post-formation period i given an initial ranking of decile j.
Figure 1: Conditional attrition rates, 1 to 8 quarters after initial rank
9all funds onshore oﬀshore
Investment Style active dead total active dead total active dead total
Convertible Arb. 8 3 11 4 1 5 4 2 6
Dedicated Short Bias 11 1 12 6 0 6 5 1 6
Emerging Markets 123 91 214 1715 32 106 7 6 182
E q u i t y M a r k e t N e u t r a l 1 0 1 5 9 1 6 0 3 82 3 6 16 33 6 9 9
Event Driven 123 33 156 61 9 70 62 24 86
F i x e d I n c o m e A r b . 1 99 2 86 281 372 0
Global Macro 21 10 31 2 2 4 19 8 27
Long/Short Equity 256 108 364 124 53 177 132 55 187
Managed Futures 165 191 356 75 66 141 90 125 215
Hedge Fund Index 322 143 465 9736 133 225 107 332
All styles 1149 648 17 97430 207637 7 19 441 1160
Table 3: Numbers of active and dead US hedge funds per investment style
discriminant functions provide a set of scores for each of the 17 styles.2 Sub-
sequently, the discriminant functions are used to determine the scores for the
subsample of funds for which the appropriate style classiﬁcation is missing,
after which each fund is allocated to its “most likely” style. While such a
procedure necessarily is subject to classiﬁcation error, its within sample per-
formance is rather well, with 52.3 % of the funds classiﬁed correctly in one
of 17 investment styles.
As mentioned above, these 17 styles closely correspond to the Tremont
hedge fund benchmarks. Tremont oﬀers a series of nine hedge fund indices,
computed on a monthly basis and constructed out of hedge funds that have at
least $10 million under management and provide audited ﬁnancial statements
(see, e.g. Lhabitant, 2001). In Table 3 we report the number of active
and dead funds assigned to a Tremont index. The investment style “Hedge
Fund Index” is a general hedge fund index and does not refer to a particular
investment style. We assigned funds without a clear investment style, like
fund-of-funds, to this category. In addition, we distinguish between oﬀshore
and onshore funds.
It appears that “Long/Short equity” and “Managed Futures” are the
most popular investment styles, with 364 and 356 funds, respectively. Fur-
thermore, the majority of the funds can be classiﬁed as oﬀshore. A large
proportion of about 53.7% of the funds with investment style “Managed
Futures” have disappeared from the database by 2000. For “Emerging Mar-
2In fact, one of these 17style categories (pure property) contained only one fund and
was not used in the discriminant analysis.
10kets”, this percentage is about 42.5%, while for “Dedicated Short Bias” this
percentage is only 8.3%. Clearly, this indicates that investment style might
be a signiﬁcant factor in explaining fund survival. We do not observe striking
diﬀerences between attrition rates of oﬀshore and onshore funds, although
the ﬁrst group has a somewhat larger proportion of dissolved funds.
In the next section, we present a model that explains attrition of hedge
funds as a function of historical returns as well as a number of fund charac-
teristics, including investment style.
3 Modelling the survival process
Variables that are likely to aﬀect attrition rates of hedge funds are historical
returns over a number of previous quarters, fund size, age of the fund, and the
fund’s investment style. To describe our survival model, let yit be an indicator
variable that indicates whether or not fund i h a sa no b s e r v e dr e t u r ninq u a r t e r
t. Our speciﬁcation describes the probability of fund survival (yit =1 )using
a longitudinal probit model, such that a fund survives if an underlying latent
variable, y∗
it is positive. That is,
y
∗




￿xi,t−1 + λt + ηit (1)




where ri,t−j is the return of fund i in quarter t−j, xi,t−1 i sav e c t o ro ff u n d -
speciﬁc characteristics, including a set of style dummies, and λt denote ﬁxed
time eﬀects describing economy wide eﬀects. The coeﬃcients γij indicate
how survival is aﬀected by the fund’s returns, lagged j quarters. Compared
to Liang (2000), who includes the average monthly return over the fund’s
history, this allows us to analyze the dynamic impact of historical returns
upon fund survival. For the moment, we ﬁx the maximum lag J at 6. The γij
coeﬃcients are assumed to be equal across funds, with the exception of those
cases in which less than J historical returns are available. In such a case, the
γij coeﬃcients are set to zero if the corresponding return is unobserved (which
is typically the case for funds with a recent inception date). This approach
prevents that the survival model is only appropriate for funds that actually
have a 6 quarter history, and thus prevents that a multi-period sampling bias
aﬀects the survival model. The model in (1) is a reduced form in the sense
that it describes attrition due to both self-selection and fund termination.
11Variable mean std.dev min max
oﬀshore 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00
Incentive Fees 16.17 7.78 0.00 50.00
Mng. Fees 1.60 1.030.00 8.00
Personal capital 0.66 0.48 0.00 1.00
Leverage 0.730.45 0.00 1.00
ln(NAV) 16.56 1.78 7.58 23.30
ln(Age) 3.52 0.92 1.10 5.62
ln(Age)2 13.25 6.16 1.21 31.55
Emerging Markets 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
Equity Market Neutral 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Event Driven 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Fixed Income Arb. 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00
Global Macro 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00
Long/Short Equity 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00
Man. Futures 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
Fund of Funds 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00
Table 4: Summary statistics fund-speciﬁc variables.
In Table 4 we present some summary statistics of the fund-speciﬁc vari-
ables (xi,t−1) that were included in the survival model in (1). These descrip-
tive statistics are based on 22739 fund/period observations, while 11 of the
fund-speciﬁc variables are dummies. It appears that 61% of the observations
are from oﬀshore hedge funds. These funds, while reporting in US$, are lo-
cated in tax-havens like the Virgin Islands. The average incentive fee of the
fund manager is about 16%,b u tc a nb ea sh i g ha s50% of realized perfor-
mance. Note that these incentive fees are only obtained when the fund has
recovered past losses (high water-mark). The annual management fee varies
from 0% to 8% (of net asset value) and has an average of 1.6%. For about
66% of the observations, the hedge fund manager invests personal capital
in the fund, while 73% of the observations correspond to hedge funds that
make use of leverage. The age of the funds varies between 3 months and 275
months (about 23 years), while the average age is about 34 months. The av-
erage size of the hedge funds, measured by their log net asset value is 16.56,
corresponding to about 15.5 million US$. About 19% of the observations
belong to so called funds-of-funds, while only 1% corresponds to hedge funds
with a “ﬁxed income arbitrage” investment style.
We estimate (1) using all investment styles, while including style dummies
to capture the possibility, as suggested by the summary statistics in Table 3,
that diﬀerent investment styles are associated with diﬀerent overall attrition
12Parameters Estimate Std.error Parameters Estimate Std. Error
intercept 2.167 0.400 ln(NAV) 0.154 0.012
r1 1.133 0.148 ln(Age) -0.956 0.149
r2 1.117 0.176 ln(Age)2 0.131 0.022
r3 1.022 0.176 Emerging Markets -0.152 0.067
r4 0.477 0.176 Equity Market Neutral -0.198 0.077
r5 0.265 0.146 Event Driven 0.110 0.088
r6 0.204 0.152 Fixed Income Arb. -0.137 0.172
oﬀshore -0.067 0.044 Global Macro -0.099 0.156
Incentive Fees -0.010 0.003Long/Short Equity -0.102 0.062
Mng. Fees -0.024 0.020 Man. Futures -0.016 0.061
Personal capital 0.084 0.042
Leverage -0.029 0.047
Loglikelihood:−2413.5076 Chi-squared test: 697.24 (DF =4 3 )
pseudoR2: 0.1262 (p =0 .0000)
Table 5: Estimation results survival model.
rates. Given the limited number of funds with investment styles “convert-
ible arbitrage” or “dedicated short bias”, no dummies are included for these
styles and the funds are allocated to the general hedge fund index (reference
category). In addition, the model includes time dummies to capture aggre-
gate shocks to the survival rates. Because fund size (NAV) is not available
f o re a c hp e r i o df o ra l lf u n d si no u rs a m p l e ,w eu s et h em o s tr e c e n to b s e r v a -
tion of net asset value available from the TASS database. Observations for
which NAV is missing and cannot be imputed are not used in estimation.3
The estimation results, based on 22739 fund/period observations, are pre-
sented in Table 5, the estimates for the time eﬀects are not reported4.T h e
results show that the impact of historical returns upon fund survival is pos-
itive and highly signiﬁcant: funds with high returns are much more likely to
survive than funds with low returns. The impact of the individual quarters
decreases with each lag. As indicated by the Chi-squared test, the variables
in the model are jointly highly signiﬁcant, while many of the variables are
also individually signiﬁcant. For example, fund size has a strong positive
impact upon survival: smaller funds are, ceteris paribus, much more likely to
3This occurs in 7% of the cases. Because we do not want to eliminate these observations
from our persistence analysis in Section 4, we also estimated a second survival model from
which ln(NAV) is excluded. The estimation results are available upon request. This
model, based on a smaller information set, is used to correct for look-ahead bias whenever
information on net asset value is missing.
4The estimates for the time dummies are available upon request by the authors.
13be dissolved than large funds. Further, the fact that a manager has invested
personal capital in the hedge fund aﬀects survival rates in a positive and
statistically signiﬁcant way. Surprisingly, the magnitude of the incentive fee
for a manager aﬀects the probability of survival in a negative and signiﬁcant
way, i.e. the higher the incentive fee, ceteris paribus, the more likely it is that
the fund will disappear in the next quarter. Age has a signiﬁcant nonlinear
eﬀect: young hedge funds have a high probability to disappear, but when
funds become more mature, the non-survival probability decreases. Most in-
vestment style dummies have a signiﬁcant impact on survival probabilities.
The funds with style “event driven” have, ceteris paribus, the highest prob-
ability to survive, while funds classiﬁed as “equity market neutral” have the
lowest survival probability. Interestingly, no signiﬁcant eﬀect is found for
the “managed futures” style. Given the high attrition rate of this class of
funds, as reported in Table 3, it must be the case that the other factors in
the model, like historical returns, already capture this eﬀect.
T h es p e c i ﬁ c a t i o nr e p o r t e di nT a b l e5i st e s t e da g a i n s tan u m b e ro fm o r e
general alternatives. For example, we test whether the model is signiﬁcantly
improved when returns lagged 7, 8 and 9 quarters are added. The value of
the likelihood ratio test statistic is 9.97, which is only marginally signiﬁcant
at the 5% level.5 Because of the number of observations that we would
loose when we extend the survival model with these three additional lags
and given the marginal rejection, we decided not to include the additional
lags. Furthermore we tested the logarithmic speciﬁcation in size against
a more general alternative. The likelihood ratio test on the inclusion of
ln(NAV)2 produces an insigniﬁcant value of 2.57. One particular alternative
speciﬁcation requires some explanation. It is conceivable that the value of the
γij coeﬃcients depends upon the number of lagged returns that is available.
For example, the marginal impact of last quarter’s return may be larger if less
historical returns are available. To test for this, we construct an alternative
model in which γij is allowed to be a function of the number of available lags.
In particular, we study the signiﬁcance of the additional variable log(J−Ji+
1)
Ji
j=1 ri,t−j, where Ji denotes the number of lagged returns that is available,
with a maximum of J. Note that the additional variable is zero whenever
J or more historical returns are observed. The likelihood ratio test statistic
produces the insigniﬁcant value of 0.62. In summary, the results of the above
tests do not indicate any serious shortcomings of the current speciﬁcation.
In order to obtain an indication of the probability that an arbitrary hedge
f u n dw i l ld i s a p p e a ri nt h en e x tq u a r t e rg i v e ni t sp a s tr e c o r do fr e t u r n sa n d
age, we use the estimates of (1) to compute the probability of disappearance.
5The asymptotic distribution is Chi-squared with 3 degrees of freedom.


























































Figure 2: Attrition probabilities by fund age and previous six quarters’ re-
turns (as implied by the estimated survival model).
In Figure 2 the attrition probabilities are reported for funds with diﬀerent
ages (in quarters) where historical returns vary from −10% to +10% for each
of the last six quarters. All other variables are ﬁxed at their sample average. It
appears that for a fund with age 12 quarters and a return record of −10% for
each of the last six quarters, the probability to disappear in the next quarter
is about 6.3%, while for a fund with the same age but a return record of +10%
for each of the last six quarters the attrition probability is only 0.9%.I ti s
clear that fund age aﬀects survival nonlinearly. Apparently, survival rates of
funds that recently started are less aﬀected by a poor historical performance
than those of funds that are around for several years, while older funds are
also less likely to dissolve.
154 Estimating Persistence in Performance
The question whether hedge funds show persistence in their performance
has received much attention in the recent literature. For example, Brown,
Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999) use annual returns of oﬀshore hedge funds
and do not ﬁnd persistence in their sample. Agarwal and Naik (2000) use
quarterly, half-yearly and annual (post-fee and pre-fee) returns and examine
short-term as well as long-term persistence. They ﬁnd that persistence is
highest at the quarterly horizon and decreases when moving to a yearly
horizon. However, persistence in quarterly returns could be aﬀected by the
fact that most hedge funds only report on an annual basis. The investment
style of the hedge funds is not relevant for the persistence pattern found by
Agarwal and Naik (2000).
In this section, we will ﬁrst examine whether there is performance persis-
tence in raw returns. Basically, we examine whether ‘winning’ funds, where
winning is deﬁned as exceeding the median fund return in a given period,
are more likely to be winners in the next period. To obtain some indications
about the probabilities that hedge funds from the top deciles remain in the
top deciles, Figure 3 reports a contingency table of quarterly performance.
Each quarter all funds are ranked in ten deciles, and this is compared with
their ranking in the previous quarter. The table also incorporates dead funds
and new funds that enter the database and is therefore not aﬀected by look-
ahead bias. Funds that are in the top decile (decile 10) have a probability of
about 20% of being a top performer in the next quarter again. However, they
also have a similar probability of ending up in the loser decile (decile 1). The
funds that performed worst (decile 1) in the ranking period, have the highest
probability of being a loser again (about 23%), but also a probability of 5%
of being dead in the next quarter. Moreover, these funds have a high proba-
bility of more than 15% to end up in the winner decile. The explanation for
this ﬁnding might be that funds in the extreme deciles (decile 1 and decile
10) are more risky than those in the other deciles. More risk is associated
with higher average returns, but also with bigger chances of extremely good
and extremely poor outcomes. Such funds are more likely to move from the
winner to the loser decile or vice versa. In line with this, we observe that
funds from the middle deciles are more likely to remain in the middle deciles
than to move to one of the extreme deciles. The probability of being dead
in the next quarter is relatively high for the lower deciles.
The previous analysis does not provide information about the levels of
average returns across the diﬀerent deciles. To investigate this, we rank the
funds in the so-called ranking period on the basis of past average returns
































Contingency table of initialand subsequent
performance rankings
Ranking criterion : past one-quarter net excessreturns
Hedge funds are sorted each quarter from 1994Q1 to 2000Q1 into ten rank portfolios
based on their previous one-quarter net excess returns. This initial ranking is
confronted to the fund’s subsequent one-quarter return ranking. The bar in cell (i,j)
represents the conditional probability of achieving a subsequent ranking of decile j
given an initial ranking of decile i. New funds are placed in a separate category. In this
case bar in cell (i,j) represents the conditional probability of achieving a ranking of
decile j in the quarter subsequent to the starting-operations quarter.
Figure 3: Contingency table of quarterly performance
17ranking is broken down into ten deciles. In the subsequent evaluation period
we calculate the average returns for each of these deciles. For instance, for the
one year ranking period this implies that the ﬁrst ranking is based on returns
over the year 1994 (i.e. the ﬁrst year of our sample), while the evaluation
period is the year 1995. The procedure is repeated over the entire sample
period, moving forward by one quarter at the time and adjusting the sample
to include those funds that have a suﬃciently long return history. As a result
these rankings are conditional upon survival over the ranking and evaluation
periods. Multi-period selection bias or look-ahead bias may thus distort the
empirical results.
As is well known by now, spurious performance persistence patterns might
arise that are due to look-ahead bias (Carpenter and Lynch, 1999). Follow-
ing the correction procedure introduced by Ter Horst, Nijman and Verbeek
(2001), we also present persistence results that are corrected for look-ahead
bias. Basically, the correction method implies a multiplication of the per-
formance measure (e.g. the average return over the ranking period) with
a weight factor, which is the ratio of an unconditional survival probability
in the numerator and a conditional survival probability in the denominator.
The latter one can be obtained from the estimated survival process that is
reported in Section 3, while the unconditional probability can be estimated
by the ratio of the funds that survived the ranking period and the number of
funds present in the sample at the beginning of the ranking period. The cor-
rection for the average returns over the evaluation period is similar, except
that the unconditional probabilities are conditional upon the fund’s decile
during the ranking period (but not upon the entire return history).
Consider the case that we are interested in persistence in raw returns at
a biannual horizon. This implies that we can only use information on funds
that have reported returns for at least eight consecutive quarters. Let Yit =1
if fund i has survived during quarters t to t +7(and Yit =0otherwise) and
let Ri denote the entire vector of fund returns. The probability that a fund is
observed in quarters t to t+7, given its returns and given its characteristics
Xit (age, management fees, investment style, net asset value), can be obtained
from the survival model. Assuming that survival is independent of current
or future returns, this probability is
P{Yit =1 |Ri,X it} =
s+7 
t=s
P{yit =1 |ri,t−1,...,xi,t−1}. (2)
Estimates for the probabilities at the right-hand side are directly obtained
from the probit model. The unconditional survival probability can easily be
estimated by the ratio of the appropriate number of funds that survived from
quarter t to t+7and the number of funds that was in the sample in quarter
18t − 1. As shown by Ter Horst, Nijman and Verbeek (2001), multiplying the
returns for funds used in the analysis by the resulting weight factors provides
the unconditional distribution of returns we are interested in.
Figure 4 presents the results at the annual frequency, while Figures 5
and 6 present persistence of raw returns at quarterly and biannual horizons,
respectively. All estimates are based on the full sample of hedge funds, ex-
cluding fund-of-funds. All ﬁgures give results with and without corrections
for look-ahead bias. These ﬁgures show some interesting patterns. At the an-
nual level, we see that the persistence pattern without corrections is slightly
J-shaped. Given the results of Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1997) and
ter Horst, Nijman and Verbeek (2001), a pattern like this may be attributable
to look-ahead bias. Correcting for look-ahead bias ﬂattens the J-shaped pat-
tern, but the three top deciles (deciles 8, 9 and 10) still show positive persis-
tence in returns. Without corrections, average returns may be overestimated
by as much as 6% (decile 1) which shows that the impact of look-ahead bias
might be quite severe. The corrections are most pronounced for the extreme
deciles, which is to be expected given that these deciles typically contain the
more risky funds. The ﬁnding that look-ahead bias has a U-shaped pattern
is due to the cross-sectional dispersion in fund speciﬁc risk. Funds ranked in
one of the extreme deciles are more likely to be ‘high risk’ funds and thus
less likely to survive. Conditional upon the fact that they did survive in the
evaluation period, they will have made better returns than average. See Ter
Horst, Nijman and Verbeek (2001) for additional discussion.
At the quarterly horizon, we clearly observe positive persistence in hedge
fund returns, particularly for the best four deciles. For example, the top
decile provides an average return over the next quarter of 23.5% (annualized)
while the bottom decile provides only about 7.5%. This corresponds to the
ﬁndings of Agarwal and Naik (2000), who also ﬁnd strong persistence at a
quarterly horizon over the period 1982 - 1998. However, in their study the
issue of look-ahead bias is not taken into account. The corrections for look-
ahead bias reduce most of the averages somewhat, although the bias is much
less than in case of an annual horizon. Because this graph refers to only one
quarter, it is not surprising that the look-ahead bias is less severe than at the
annual level. The bias correction does not change the persistence pattern very
much. When we move to the biannual level, the number of funds that can be
used to construct the ﬁgure is substantially reduced. Both the corrected and
uncorrected persistence patterns show a clear positive persistence, with the
exception of the top decile. The subsequent 8-quarter performance of the top
decile is disappointing, even without corrections for look-ahead bias. This
strange eﬀect is probably partly due to the reduced number of funds that















Figure 4: Annual persistence in raw returns. Returns are annualized per
decile.
funds have returns for 16 consecutive quarters or more. Another explanation
might be that the results are driven by a few funds that have extreme returns
for one or more 2-year periods. Given that average returns are computed on
the basis of overlapping samples, a few extreme returns may have a strong
impact. To investigate the impact of these extreme observations, we also
computed average returns in the evaluation period giving zero weight to
t h e1 %l o w e s ta n d1 %h i g h e s tr e t u r n s . T h i si se x p e c t e dt or e s u l ti nm o r e
robust estimates for the expected returns during the evaluation period. The
results are presented in Figure 7 and indicate average returns, particularly
for deciles 1 and 10, that are probably more reasonable. The fact that the
outlier correction has a large impact for the extreme deciles indicates that
the estimated returns are not very accurate. Nevertheless, it is clear from
both ﬁgures that 2-year losers are expected to perform very weak during the
next two years. On the other hand, 2-year winners are expected to perform
poorly too in the future.
One explanation for the positive persistence in raw returns, after correct-
ing for look-ahead bias, is the presence of cross-sectional variation in expected
fund returns due to heterogeneous style or (systematic) risk characteristics.















Figure 5: Quarterly persistence in raw returns. Returns are annualized per
decile.
funds this is somewhat more complicated than for mutual funds. Hedge fund
returns typically have low correlations with returns on standard asset pricing
factors like the return on the market portfolio. This is an important feature
of hedge funds and makes them an interesting investment vehicle for diversi-
ﬁcation opportunities. The reason for the low correlation is that hedge funds
often follow highly dynamic investment styles, and are allowed to invest in
derivatives, to take short positions or to make use of leverage. The question
how to obtain risk-adjusted returns of hedge funds receives a lot of attention
in the current literature. Basically, two approaches can be found, the ﬁrst ap-
proach makes use of indices that have option like pay-oﬀ structures (see, e.g.
Fung and Hsieh, 1997, 2001, and Agarwal and Naik, 2000), while the second
approach uses peer group hedge fund indices (see, e.g. Lhabitant, 2001). The
idea behind the ﬁrst approach is that hedge fund strategies generate option-
like returns that should be reﬂected in the benchmark indices. The second
approach avoids the problem and simply makes use of indices constructed
out of other hedge funds with the same reported style as the funds under
consideration. The ﬁrst approach is only suitable for very speciﬁc trading
strategies, while the second approach is much more general. However, it is





















Figure 6: Biannual persistence in raw returns. Returns are annualized per
decile.
as style-adjusted or relative returns instead of risk-adjusted returns. Given
that in our study the focus is on persistence in hedge fund returns in general,
and not for a speciﬁc investment style, we decided to follow the second ap-
proach, and examine whether hedge funds show persistence in style-adjusted
or relative returns. The style benchmarks we employ are the Tremont hedge
fund style indices, and correspond to the investment styles of the hedge funds
in our sample (see Table 3). Basically, we subtract from the raw return of a
hedge fund the return on the style benchmark the fund belongs to. Similarly
to the procedure followed in case of raw returns, we examine whether there
is persistence in relative returns. Figure 8 presents the results at the annual
frequency, while Figures 9 and 10 present persistence of relative returns at
quarterly and biannual horizons, respectively. Figure 11 presents persistence
of relative returns over two-year horizons where, as before, the most extreme
observations are given zero weight. All ﬁgures give results with and without
corrections for look-ahead bias.
At an annual horizon we ﬁnd a strong persistence pattern for the top
three deciles (decile 8, 9 and 10). The funds in these top deciles, on aver-
age, outperform their style benchmark. The outperformance increases from
















Figure 7: Biannual persistence in raw returns (robust estimates). Returns
are annualized per decile.
(corrected relative returns). Underperformance and persistence of negative
relative returns is found for the remaining deciles. The eﬀect of look-ahead
bias is most severe for decile 1, where the bias is about 6%. At a quarterly
horizon the persistence of relative returns is even stronger. For decile 6 this
outperformance is about 1% and increases to about 11% for decile 10. Simi-
larly to the results of the raw returns, the eﬀect of look-ahead bias is much
smaller at a quarterly horizon than at an annual horizon. At a biannual hori-
zon we do not observe any persistence of relative returns. Almost all funds
show, on average, underperformance with respect to their corresponding style
benchmark. When the 1% highest and lowest observations are omitted from
the evaluation period, we ﬁnd qualitatively similar results (Figure 11).
5 Concluding remarks
Empirical studies analyzing the performance of hedge funds are hampered by
high attrition rates. The results in this paper clearly indicate that fund attri-
tion is driven by historical returns, attrition rates being higher for funds that


















Figure 8: Annual persistence of style adjusted, relative returns. Returns are
annualized per decile.
sistence in performance are aﬀected by look-ahead bias, as one is implicitly
conditioning upon the fund having observed returns for a number of consec-
utive quarters. To eliminate such biases, it is possible to use a weighting
procedure, which requires an appropriate model that relates fund survival to
fund performance and other observables.
In this paper we speciﬁed an empirical model for hedge fund survival in
the US. We determined the persistence in fund returns with and without
correcting for look-ahead bias, based upon the survival model and using a
simple weighting procedure. The resulting graphs indicate that the look-
ahead bias is quite severe. For the one quarter and four quarter horizons,
the corrected results indicate positive persistence in raw fund returns. That
is, the best 20 to 30% of the funds are expected to provide above average
returns in the subsequent evaluation period too. As reported by Agerwal
and Naik (2000), persistence is particularly strong at quarterly horizons and
somewhat weaker at annual horizons. At a biannual horizon the results
are ambiguous. The corrected and uncorrected average returns show strong
persistence for all the deciles, except the top decile. A more robust estimate
for the expected return, where the 1% lowest and highest returns got zero


















Figure 9: Quarterly persistence of style-adjusted, relative returns. Returns
are annualized per decile.
average returns for deciles 1 and 10. Nevertheless, it can be expected that
the losers (decile 1) continue to perform poorly at biannual horizon.
In order to check whether the presence of cross-sectional variation in
expected returns due to style or risk characteristics explains the observed
persistence patterns in raw returns, we examined persistence in style-adjusted
or relative returns. The investment styles of the hedge funds in our sample
correspond to the commonly used Tremont hedge fund style indices. By
subtracting from the raw hedge fund returns the return of the corresponding
style benchmark, and following the same procedure as in case of raw returns,
we determined the persistence in relative returns with and without correcting
for look-ahead bias. At a quarterly and annual horizon the graphs show that,
on average, the top deciles outperform their style benchmark. For the top
10% of the hedge funds this outperformance is almost 6% (annualized) for
an annual horizon, and even more than 11% (annualized) for a quarterly
horizon. At a biannual horizon we mainly found underperformance of the
hedge funds with respect to their style benchmark.
At the methodological level, the results in this paper stress the importance
of correcting for look-ahead bias. The impact of this multi-period condition-




















Figure 10: Biannual persistence of style-adjusted, relative returns. Returns
are annualized per decile.
suggestion of Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999) that for hedge
funds positive and negative survival-related biases may cancel out, is clearly
not supported by our results.
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